PUGH’ S LAWN AND LANDSCAPE COMPANY, INC. V.
JAYCON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION: THE
TENNESSEE COURT OF APPEALS LIMITS JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS
BECKY L. JACOBS*
INTRODUCTION
In its April 2009 opinion in Pugh’s Lawn Landscape Company, Inc. v. Jaycon
Development Corporation,1 the Tennessee Court of Appeals announced its judgment that
Tennessee’s arbitration statutes do not permit parties to modify by agreement the
scope of judicial review of an arbitral award. The Pugh’s Lawn decision answered a state
law question left unanswered by the United States Supreme Court in Hall Street
Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.,2 a 2009 case in which the Court held that the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”)3 did not permit parties contractually to expand the grounds
for vacating or modifying an arbitral award.4 While the ruling in Hall Street
contemplated the possibility that expanded judicial review might be permissible
under state statutory or common law,5 the Tennessee Court of Appeals’ decision in
Pugh’s Lawn has, for now, settled this state statutory issue in Tennessee.6
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRAL AWARDS
The precise contours of judicial review of arbitral awards have divided courts
and confounded contract drafters. Section 9 of the FAA states that courts “must”
confirm an award made pursuant to an arbitration “unless” it is “vacated, modified,
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Pugh’s Lawn Landscape Co. v. Jaycon Dev. Corp., No. W2008-01366-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 1099270
(Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2009).

2 Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008). Pinpoint citations to
this case herein shall refer to the S. Ct. publication of the case, as the U.S. volume is not yet available.
3

9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2009).

4

Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1403.

5

Id. at 1406.

6

Pugh’s Lawn, 2009 WL 1099270, at *6.
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or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11” of the FAA.7 Section 10 sets forth
four grounds for vacating an arbitral award, including circumstances:
where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
. . . where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators
. . . ; . . . where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct . . . or of any
other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been
prejudiced; or . . . where the arbitrators exceeded [or imperfectly
executed] their powers.8
Grounds for modifying or correcting an award appear in section 11 of the
FAA and include “an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident
material mistake,” an award by arbitrators upon a matter not submitted to them, and
an imperfection in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy.9 To
supplement these very limited statutory grounds for vacating an award, parties
seeking to arbitrate under the auspices of the FAA10 frequently contracted for
heightened judicial scrutiny of awards under a broader set of circumstances,
including review for legal error or evidentiary failures.11 With provisions such as
these, parties sought to minimize one of the most risky aspects of arbitration, the
limited ability to appeal an unfavorable and/or irrational award.12
This practice, however, was not without controversy, and the United States
Circuit Courts of Appeals were split as to whether such provisions were enforceable
pursuant to the FAA.13 Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street, the
7

9 U.S.C. § 9 (2009).

8

Id. at § 10(a)(1).

9

Id. at § 11.

10

The United States Supreme Court has declared that the FAA’s substantive provisions apply in both
federal and state fora with regard to the determination of the enforceability of an agreement to
arbitrate. Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). However, the
Supreme Court also has made it clear that the federal policy is not to occupy the entire field of
arbitration, but rather is to ensure enforceability according to the terms of private agreements to
arbitrate. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989) (“There is no federal policy
favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to ensure the
enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements to arbitrate.”). Parties therefore must
carefully weigh the choice-of-law provisions when drafting arbitration agreements.
11 See, e.g., Stanley A. Leasure, Arbitration After Hall Street v. Mattel: What Happens Next?, 31 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 273 (2009).
12

ADR Brief, The Calm and the Storm: Arbitration Experts Speak Out on Hall Street Associates, 26
ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 104 (May 2008).

13

Whitney R. Duesman, Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.: How the Supreme Court Balanced
Arbitral Efficiency and Parties’ Intent, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1497, 1500 (2009).

2009]

PUGH’S LAWN LANDSCAPE COMPANY, INC.

201

Ninth and Tenth Circuits limited judicial review of arbitral awards to the FAA’s
enumerated grounds,14 while the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits held
that parties could, consistent with the FAA, contractually specify the scope of
judicial review of an award in an arbitration.15
The Supreme Court firmly resolved this split in Hall Street, holding that
sections “10 and 11 respectively provide the FAA’s exclusive grounds for expedited
vacatur and modification” of arbitration awards.16 In so concluding, the Court
considered and rejected two arguments that would have led to the contrary result:
the first a common law argument based upon the “manifest disregard [of the law]”
language in Wilko v. Swan,17 and the second an argument based upon the national
policy embodied in the FAA of promoting the enforcement of arbitration
agreements.18
The Court was not persuaded by these arguments, focusing instead upon the
language and construction of the FAA to conclude:
On application for an order confirming the arbitration award, the
14

See Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 1000 (9th Cir. 2003);
Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 937 (10th Cir. 2001); Chi. Typographical Union No. 16
v. Chi. Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501, 1504-05 (7th Cir. 1991). In dicta, the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits also expressed reservations about contractual provisions purporting to expand the bases for
judicial review of arbitral awards. See UHC Mgmt. Co. v. Computer Scis. Corp., 148 F.3d 992, 997
(8th Cir. 1998); Chi. Typographical Union, 935 F.2d at 1504-05.
15 See P.R. Tel. Co. v. United States Phone Mfg. Corp., 427 F.3d 21, 31 (1st Cir. 2005); Jacada (Eur.),
Ltd. v. Int’l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 710 (6th Cir. 2005); Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v.
Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 293 (3d Cir. 2001); Syncor Int’l Corp. v. McLeland, No. 96-2261, 1997 WL
452245, at *6 (4th Cir. Aug. 11, 1997) (unpublished decision); Gateway Techs., Inc. v. MCI
Telecomms. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1995).
16

Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1403 (2008). Hall Street concerned a
domestic arbitral award subject to the FAA. Id. The implications of the decision for international
arbitral awards subject to the New York Convention, the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, codified at
9 U.S.C. § 201, and the Panama Convention, the Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975, 104 Stat. 448, O.A.S.T.S. No. 42, codified at 9 U.S.C. § 302,
are unclear.

17

Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436 (1953). For a detailed analysis of the Court’s discussion of the
“manifest disregard of the law” basis for vacatur and its validity post-Hall Street, see Robert Ellis,
Imperfect Minimalism: Unanswered Questions in Hall Street Associates L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396
(2008), 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1187 (2009); Thomas N. Pieper; “Manifest Disregard of the Law”
After Hall Street – From One Circuit Split to the Next, 22 INT’L L. PRACTICUM 47 (2009).
18

Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1403-04. The Court instead emphasized a second, somewhat philosophically
conflicting, foundational policy underpinning the FAA, that of finality and efficiency. Id. at 1405-06.
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court ‘must grant’ the order ‘unless the award is vacated, modified, or
corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title.’ There is
nothing malleable about ‘must grant,’ which unequivocally tells courts
to grant confirmation in all cases, except when one of the ‘prescribed’
exceptions applies. This does not sound remotely like a provision
meant to tell a court what to do just in case the parties say nothing
else.19
The Court’s holding on the exclusivity of the grounds set forth in the FAA,
however, did not exclude a “more searching review based on authority outside the
[FAA] statute.”20 Emphasizing that its decision spoke only to the FAA, the Court
suggested that “judicial review of different scope is arguable” under state statutory or
common law or as an exercise of a United States District Court’s case management
authority under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16.21 The Court provided little
guidance on these alternatives,22 leaving to other courts a number of questions for
further consideration, one of which was at issue in the Pugh’s Lawn case before the
19

Id. at 1405. Justice Stevens, writing for himself and Justice Kennedy, dissented, as did Justice
Breyer, writing alone. Id. at 1408-10. A thorough analysis of the Hall Street opinion is beyond the
scope of this short comment. However, should readers seek such analysis, the case, hailed as a
“landmark,” see Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. L.
REV. 1103, 1105 (2009), has generated a prolific volume of commentary and speculation from
academics and practitioners alike, including, inter alia, Duesman, supra note 13; Ellis, supra note 17;
Leasure, supra note 11; Pieper; supra note 17; Reuben, infra note 19; Stuart M. Widman & Donald Lee
Rome, Judicial Remands of Challenged Awards: Legal and Procedural Issues After Hall Street, 63 DISP. RESOL.
J. 50 (2009).
20

Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1406-07.

21 Id. At the conclusion of a bench trial before the United States District Court for the District of
Oregon in Hall Street, the parties attempted unsuccessfully to mediate an indemnification claim and
proposed to submit the issue to arbitration. Id. at 1400 The District Court agreed, and the parties
drafted an arbitration agreement which provided, in part, that:

[t]he United States District Court . . . may enter judgment upon any award, either
by confirming the award or by vacating, modifying or correcting the award. The
Court shall
vacate, modify or correct any award: (i) where the arbitrator’s
findings of facts are not supported by substantial evidence, or (ii) where the
arbitrator’s conclusions of law are erroneous.
Id. at 1400-01. The District Court adopted this agreement as an order. Id. at 1400. According to the
Supreme Court, it was this circumstance that implicated the trial court’s authority to manage cases
under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 1407-08. Because the parties had not
briefed or addressed issues of “waiver and the relation of the FAA both to Rule 16 and the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.,” the Court left them open to be
pursued on remand. Id. at 1407-08.
22

Id. at 1407. For an in-depth discussion of these alternatives, see Reuben, supra note 19.
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Tennessee Court of Appeals.
THE PUGH’S LAWN DECISION
In Pugh’s Lawn, the Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed the unresolved state
statutory question raised in Hall Street.23 Interestingly, the parties in Pugh’s Lawn did not
raise the issue; the Court itself did.24 In the case, Pugh’s Lawn Landscape Company,
Inc. filed a breach of contract action against Jaycon Development Corporation, to
which Jaycon responded and counterclaimed, also for breach of contract.25 The
parties’ original contract specified the application of Tennessee law, but it did not
require that disputes be submitted to arbitration.26
After limited discovery, however, the parties did agree to arbitrate the
matter.27 The trial court’s Order of Reference to Arbitration and Reservation of
Appellate Rights set forth the terms of the arbitration, one of which stated that:
[t]he parties agree that a) any and all findings, rulings or judgments
issued by the arbitrator shall be appealable, using the same standards
of review, as if the finding, ruling or judgment in question was issued
by [the Circuit Court]; b) that the agreement that the arbitrator’s
ruling is appealable was material consideration for the agreement of
each party to submit this matter to arbitration; c) each party agrees
that if this matter is appealed, neither party will raise an issue on
appeal that the arbitrator’s ruling is not appealable, that an ‘arbitrary
and capricious’ standard of review is applicable due to the appeal
arising out of an arbitration, or any other issues relating to the fact
that the findings of facts and conclusions of law were reached by an
arbitrator, as opposed to a Judge of Circuit Court.28
The trial court’s order was entered by consent of the parties, and the parties
proceeded to arbitration.29
After the hearing, the arbitrator issued a written decision that awarded to
23

Pugh’s Lawn Landscape Co. v. Jaycon Dev. Corp., No. W2008-01366-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL
1099270, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2009).

24

Id.

25

Id. at *1.

26

Id.

27

Id.

28

Id.

29

Id.
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Jaycon the sum of $51,082.20, plus reasonable attorney fees, the costs of the
arbitration, and court costs.30 Jaycon then filed a motion asking the trial court to
affirm the arbitrator’s award.31 Pugh’s Lawn did not file a response to this motion,
nor did it file a motion asking the trial court to vacate or modify the arbitrator’s
award.32 The trial court then issued an order confirming the arbitrator’s award and
entering a judgment in favor of Jaycon.33
An appeal to the Tennessee Court of Appeals followed, in which Pugh’s
Lawn asked the Court to review the arbitrator’s initial decision rather than the trial
court’s final order.34 At no time during the initial appellate process did either party
raise the unresolved jurisdictional issue from Hall Street.35 At oral argument, the
Court itself “questioned whether the parties could modify the judicial standard of
review of an arbitrator’s decision.”36
In its April 2009 opinion, the Court answered this question in the negative,
holding “that the arbitration agreement between [the parties] improperly expanded
the scope of judicial review.”37 It began by noting that parties in Tennessee have
several alternative dispute resolution processes from which to choose, including
negotiation, mediation, non-binding arbitration, and arbitration.38
Rejecting the apparently post hoc argument made by Pugh’s Lawn that the
parties had not agreed to binding arbitration, the Court examined the question of
which statute, the FAA or the Tennessee statute,39 governed the particular
arbitration.40 Because both parties were Tennessee corporations, because the initial
contract between the parties required any disputes to be heard by Tennessee courts
30 Id. at *2. The arbitrator set the amount of Jaycon’s attorney fees and the costs of the arbitration in a
second decision. Id.
31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id.

35

See id.

36

Id. at *3.

37

Id. at *6.

38 Id. at *3 (citing Thomas R. McCoy, The Sophisticated Consumer’s Guide to Alternative Dispute Resolution
Techniques: What You Should Expect (or Demand) from ADR Services, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 975, 975 (1996));
see also TENN. SUP. CT. R. 31.
39

TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-301 to -320 (2009).

40

Pugh’s Lawn, 2009 WL 1099270, at *3.
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under Tennessee law, and because the original dispute involved matters occurring
solely in Tennessee, the Court concluded that the Tennessee statute, a version of the
Uniform Arbitration Act (“UAA”), applied.41
Section 313(a) of the Tennessee statute42 addresses vacatur in language very
similar to that of the FAA, providing that a trial court “shall” vacate an arbitrator’s
award under the following circumstances:
(1) The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means;
(2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral or
corruption in any of the arbitrators or misconduct prejudicing the rights of
any party;
(3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
(4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause
being shown therefor or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy
or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of § 29-5306, as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or
(5) There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely
determined in proceedings under § 29-5-303 and the party did not participate
in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection.43
41

Id. The Uniform Arbitration Act (“UAA”) was promulgated in 1955 by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL”). According to the NCCUSL, a “primary
purpose of the 1955 Act was to insure the enforceability of agreements to arbitrate in the face of often
times hostile state law.” UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT Prefatory Note (2000), 7 U.L.A. 2 (2009).
42

TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-313(a) (2009).

43

Id. at (1)-(5). The fifth ground is an addition to those provided for in the FAA. The Revised UAA,
adopted by the NCCUSL in 2000, adds a sixth ground for vacatur:
(a) Upon [motion] to the court by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the court shall vacate
an award made in the arbitration proceeding if:
(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
(2) there was:
(A) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator;
(B) corruption by an arbitrator; or
(C) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to the
arbitration proceeding;
(3) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of sufficient cause
for postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the controversy, or
otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to Section 15, so as to prejudice
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Modifications and correction of awards are addressed in the Tennessee
statute’s section 314(a)(1)-(3),44 and, if an application for review is denied under
either section, the trial court must confirm the award.45
Having reached this conclusion regarding the applicable law, the Court
tackled the primary issue: whether the parties could agree to modify the statutory
standards by which courts review arbitration awards.46 The issue, the Court opined,
implicated two competing values underlying the arbitration policy embedded in the
FAA and the UAA, the model for the relevant Tennessee statute.47 The first
principle, contractual autonomy,48 operates to ensure that agreements to arbitrate are
enforced according to their terms.49 In cases such as these, where parties contract to
substantially the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding;
(4) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator’s powers;
(5) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in the
arbitration proceeding without raising the objection under Section 15(c) not later
than the beginning of the arbitration hearing; or
(6) the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation of an
arbitration as required in Section 9 so as to prejudice substantially the rights of a
party to the arbitration proceeding.
UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (2000) § 23, 7 U.L.A. 77-78 (2009). Other states have established different
standards in their statutes, at least one of which explicitly authorizes expanded judicial review. See, e.g.,
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23B-4(c) (2009) (Parties may “expand[ ] the scope of judicial review of an award
by expressly providing for such expansion.”).
44

TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-314(a)(1)-(3) (2009). The statute provides:
Upon application . . . the [trial] court shall modify or correct the [arbitrator’s] award where:
(1) There was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the description
of any person, thing or property referred to in the award;
(2) The arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them and the award may
be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues submitted; or
(3) The award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the controversy.

Id.
45

TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-313(d), -314(b) (2009).

46

Pugh’s Lawn, 2009 WL 1099270, at *4.

47

Id.

48

Reuben, supra note 19, at 1130-33.

49 See Volt Info. Sci. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989)
(explaining that the federal policy is to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of “private
agreements to arbitrate”).

2009]

PUGH’S LAWN LANDSCAPE COMPANY, INC.

207

expand the statutory grounds for judicial review, this first value comes into direct
conflict with the second principle, that of process finality and efficiency.50
In order to determine how the Tennessee statute resolved this philosophical
tension, the Court sought guidance from other courts, turning first to the United
States Supreme Court’s conclusion in Hall Street that the FAA “substantiated a
national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain
arbitration’s essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway.”51 It next examined
the split among the various state courts52 that had addressed the issue post-Hall Street
in the context of their versions of the UAA.53 The Court concluded that, because
Tennessee authority appeared to favor the finality of arbitration,54 “Tennessee
court[s] may vacate or modify an arbitration award only under the grounds provided
in [the statute].”55
PROSPECTS FOR ARBITRAL REVIEW POST-HALL STREET AND PUGH’S LAWN
The Hall Street and Pugh’s Lawn decisions are significant ones for consumers of
50 See Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1405 (2008) (noting that the FAA substantiates a
“national policy favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s
essential virtue of resolving disputes straightaway”).
51

Pugh’s Lawn, 2009 WL 1099270, at *5 (quoting Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1405).

52 Compare John T. Jones Constr. Co. v. City of Grand Forks, 665 N.W.2d 698, 704 (N.D. 2003) and
Dick v. Dick, 534 N.W.2d 185, 191 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), with Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV,
Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 606 (Cal. 2008).
53

Pugh’s Lawn, 2009 WL 1099270, at *5. The Pugh’s Lawn court noted that “[u]nder Tenn. Code Ann. §
29-5-320, [it was] required to construe the arbitration statutes so as to conform with the laws of the
other states which have adopted the UAA.” Id. at n.1 (citing Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314,
318 (Tenn. 1996); T.R. Mills Contractors, Inc. v. WHR Enters., LLC, 93 S.W.3d 861, 868-69 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 2002)).
54

Arnold v. Morgan Keegan & Co., 914 S.W.2d 445, 452 (Tenn. 1996). In Arnold, the Tennessee
Supreme Court opined that:
[t]he reason for attaching such a high degree of conclusiveness to an award made
by arbitrators is that the parties have, themselves, by agreement, substituted a
tribunal of their own choosing for the one provided and established by law, to the
end that they may avoid the expense usually incurred by litigation and bring the
cause to a speedy and final determination. To permit a dissatisfied party to set
aside the arbitration award and to invoke the Court’s judgment upon the merits of
the cause would render arbitration merely a step in the settlement of the dispute,
instead of its final determination.
Id. at 452.
55

Pugh’s Lawn, 2009 WL 1099270, at *6.
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arbitration. There have been dire predictions that parties now will eschew arbitration
as a means of dispute resolution absent the availability of expanded judicial review.56
However, while some may explore other options, the benefits of the arbitral process
likely will still be attractive to the vast majority, and neither Hall Street nor Pugh’s Lawn
has limited too completely parties’ contractual autonomy regarding process design.
What, then, does remain for parties seeking to retain the ability to have an
arbitral award reviewed? Recall that the Hall Street court expressly stated that its
holding did not preclude parties from seeking a “more searching review based on
authority outside the” FAA.57 Further, while the court in Pugh’s Lawn did not
address this directly, the holding in that decision very narrowly focused on the
vacatur standards in Tennessee’s arbitration statute, leaving open the possibility that
authority for post-award review exists beyond that statute’s provisions.58
The Supreme Court itself suggested several such possibilities in Hall Street.59
The circumstances of that case prompted the Court to question whether expanded
review might be possible pursuant to a court’s inherent authority to manage its cases
under the relevant rules of civil procedure or pursuant to statutes that authorize
courts to refer matters to arbitration, such as the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act
of 1998.60
Of course, a court’s case management authority has limited application and
offers no authority in the context of pre-dispute arbitral agreements. For parties
bound by pre-dispute arbitral provisions specifying broadened judicial review, Hall
Street also posited that state statutory law may offer authority for enforcement.61 All
states have arbitration statutes, but only one of which, the New Jersey statute,62
56

See Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1406 (“Hall Street and its amici say parties will flee from arbitration if
expanded review is not open to them.”). See also Leasure, supra note 11, at 306-307.
57

Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1406.

58

Pugh’s Lawn, 2009 WL 1099270, at *6.

59

Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1407.

60

Id. (“The parties’ supplemental arguments . . . implicate issues of . . . the relation of the FAA both to
Rule 16 and the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. . ..”). In both Hall
Street and Pugh’s Lawn, the parties entered into arbitration agreements during the course of litigation,
and the agreements were approved and entered as court orders. Hall Street, 128 S. Ct. at 1400; Pugh’s
Lawn, 2009 WL 1099270, at *1.
61

Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1406 (“The FAA is not the only way into court for parties wanting review of
arbitration awards: they may contemplate enforcement under state statutory or common law . . ..”).
The question of FAA preemption in this context is beyond the scope of this essay. See, e.g., Reuben,
supra note 19, at 1156; see also Ellis, supra note 17, at 1194-95.

62

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23B-4(c) (2009) (Parties may “expand[ ] the scope of judicial review of an
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explicitly authorizes expanded judicial review of arbitral awards. Like Tennessee,
most states have enacted a version of the UAA,63 which is silent on the issue. At
least 13 states have adopted the Revised UAA.64 When revising the UAA in 2000,
the drafters debated, but ultimately did not include, a provision that would permit
parties to contract for judicial review of errors of facts or law in the arbitrator’s
award.65
Post-Hall Street, state courts are being asked to determine whether these state
arbitration laws provide authority for parties seeking to contract for broadened
review in court. As we have seen, the Tennessee Court of Appeals in Pugh’s Lawn
responded in the negative,66 as have courts in several other states.67 One court in
California, on the other hand, has held that a contract providing for expanded
judicial review is enforceable under California’s arbitration statute.68
In addition to state arbitration statutes, the Hall Street court opined that state
award by expressly providing for such expansion.”).
63

Twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UAA, or some version thereof,
including Tennessee. See Stanley A. Leasure & Kent P. Ragan, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims:
Patient’s Dilemma and Doctor’s Delight?, 28 MISS. C. L. REV. 51, 56 n.28 (2008-09) “The following states
have adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1956: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming.” Id. (citing UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (1956) Table of
Jurisdictions Wherein Act Has Been Adopted, 7 U.L.A. 99 (2009)).
64

Thirteen states have passed the RUAA: Alaska, Colorado, the District of Columbia, Hawaii,
Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Utah, and
Washington.
See Uniform Law Comm’rs, Uniform Arbitration Act (2000), available at
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-aa.asp.

65

Francis J. Pavetti, Chair, RUAA Drafting Committee, Policy Statement, Revised Uniform Arbitration
Act (May 15, 2000).
66

Pugh’s Lawn Landscape Co. v. Jaycon Dev. Corp., No. W2008-01366-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL
1099270, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2009).

67

See supra note 52; see also Dick v. Dick, 534 N.W.2d 185, 191 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (the statutory
grounds are the exclusive avenues for a court to vacate or modify an arbitrator’s award); John T. Jones
Const. Co. v. City of Grand Forks, 665 N.W.2d 698, 704 (N.D. 2003) (“[A] court may vacate or
modify an award only if one of the grounds set forth in [the statute] is present.”); Quinn v. Nafta
Traders, Inc., 257 S.W.3d 795, 799 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (“[P]arties seeking judicial review of an
arbitration award covered under the [Texas arbitration statute] cannot contractually agree to expand
the scope of that review and are instead limited to judicial review based on the statutory grounds
enumerated in the statute.”).

68

Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 606 (Cal. 2008) (express arbitral
agreements incorporating traditional judicial review are enforceable under the state arbitration statute).
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common law may offer yet another route into court for parties seeking review of
arbitration awards.69 Parties potentially could contractually provide that enforcement
of arbitral awards would be based upon principles of state contract law. Courts seem
willing to undertake such reviews, so long as the specified standards of review are
not unusual. One court noted that “just as the parties to any contract are limited in
the constraints they may place on judicial review, an arbitration agreement providing
that a ‘judge would review the award by flipping a coin or studying the entrails of a
dead fowl’ would be unenforceable.”70
The opinion in Hall Street called into question the availability of one widelyaccepted option for parties seeking expanded judicial review pre-Hall Street: the
judicially-created “manifest disregard of the law” basis for vacatur.71 Courts created
this standard as an additional non-statutory ground to allow judges to vacate arbitral
awards when arbitrators were conscious of, yet “disregarded,” the controlling law.72
While the Court in Hall Street did not explicitly disclaim it as a ground for vacatur, it
cast doubt upon this interpretation by conjecturing that manifest disregard may not
be an independent ground for review.73 Rather, it may simply be one way of
referring to the FAA’s section 10 vacatur grounds generally or to section 10(a)(3)’s
“guilty of misconduct” or section 10(a)(4)’s “exceeded their powers” standards
specifically.74 Courts are undecided whether “manifest disregard” survived Hall Street
as a non-statutory ground or merely as “judicial gloss”75 on section 10’s grounds.76
69

Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1406 (2008).

70

Cable Connection, Inc., 190 P.3d at 605 (quoting Lapine Tech. Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884,
891 (9th Cir. 1997) (Kozinski, J., concurring), overruled by Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade
Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2003)).
71

See Jill I. Gross, Hall Street Blues: The Uncertain Future of Manifest Disregard, 37 SECS. REG. L.J. 232
(2009); Pieper, supra note 17, at 47; see also Hiro Aragaki, The Mess of Manifest Disregard, 119 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 1 (2009), http://yalelawjournal.org/2009/09/29/aragaki.html. At least one state has
legislatively incorporated the “manifest disregard” standard into its arbitration statute. See GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-9-13(b)(5) (2009). State courts have split on its viability as a judicially created basis for
vacatur. Compare Weiner v. Jones, 610 S.E. 2d 850 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (adopting the manifest
disregard standard) with Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 118 P.3d 141 (Idaho 2005) (refusing to adopt the
standard).
72

See Pieper, supra note 17, at 47.

73

Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1403.

74

Id.

75

Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2008).

76

See Pieper, supra note 17, at 48-49. Compare Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d
1277 (9th Cir. 2009) (manifest disregard is still viable after Hall Street) with Prime Therapeutics LLC v.
Omnicare, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 993, 999 (D. Minn. 2008) (manifest disregard standard did not

2009]

PUGH’S LAWN LANDSCAPE COMPANY, INC.

211

The Hall Street Court’s focus on section 10(a)(4)’s “exceeded their powers”
language has inspired parties to contractually restrict arbitrators from committing errors
of law or fact.77 Should an arbitrator fail to adhere to this contractual restriction, courts
may find this to be a valid ground for vacatur under section 10(a)(4) or its state law
equivalent.78
While neither Hall Street nor Pugh’s Lawn discussed or speculated upon them,
courts have referred to other non-statutory grounds for expanded judicial review.79
Commentators have suggested that several of these grounds, that an arbitral award is
“arbitrary and capricious”80 or “completely irrational,”81 are no longer viable.82
The “public policy” exception, on the other hand, may still have life after Hall
Street and its state progeny. Courts historically have been willing to consider vacatur
of arbitral awards on public policy grounds.83 The Supreme Court has referred to
this public policy standard of review as a “specific application of the more general
doctrine, rooted in the common law, that a court may refuse to enforce contracts
that violate law or public policy.”84 The standard is a very strict one as an award will
only be vacated on public policy grounds when enforcement of the award violates or

survive Hall Street).
77

See Hall St., 128 S. Ct. at 1403-04.

78

At least one court has so held. See Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190 P.3d at 589 (this
holding is based upon an analysis of California’s arbitration statute). See also Ellis, supra note 17, at
1195. One scholar has discussed Hall Street’s impact on so-called “restricted submissions.” Reuben,
supra note 19, at 1150-51. Professor Reuben defines these submissions as those “which compel the
arbitrator to apply the law” and in which “the arbitrator may make an initial decision on the law, but
the parties reserve for the court the power to make a final decision, thus allowing for judicial review
for questions of law.” Id. The Professor opines that Hall Street invalidates such submissions in public
courts, but that their review may still be possible by private arbitrators. Id.
79

See, e.g., Reuben, supra note 19, at 1113.

80

Peebles v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 431 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized three non-statutory bases for vacatur of an
arbitration award. The award may be vacated (1) if it is arbitrary and capricious, (2) if its enforcement
is contrary to public policy, or (3) if it evinces a manifest disregard of the law.”).

81

Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 514 F.3d 833, 846 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Review of an
arbitration award is ‘both limited and highly deferential’ and the arbitration award ‘may be vacated
only if it is completely irrational [or] constitutes manifest disregard of the law.’” (citations omitted)).
82

See, e.g., Reuben, supra note 19, at 1141; Leasure, supra note 11, at 308-09.

83

See, e.g., United Paperworkers Int’l v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42 (1987).

84

Id.
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directly conflicts with an explicit, well-defined, and dominant public policy.85 Some
have speculated that the Hall Street Court’s insistence on the exclusivity of the FAA
grounds for vacatur may preclude application of the public policy doctrine.86
However, others believe that it will have little or no effect on the doctrine’s
availability for a number of reasons,87 some pragmatic and some based upon legal
analysis. From a legal perspective, the public policy exception is a broad legal
concept that is applicable to, and has been enforced by, the courts in the context of
all types of contracts, not merely arbitral awards.88 Further, practically speaking, it is
unlikely that the judiciary will use its authority to enforce awards that violate widelyheld public policies, risking its credibility and diminishing its public capital.89
Accordingly, this extra-statutory ground may still be extant post-Hall Street.
Outside of the courtroom setting, parties have other options for seeking review
of arbitral awards. One or more layers of arbitral review may be built into parties’
contractually-agreed arbitration process, including review by another arbitrator or panel
of appellate arbitrators. Several of the major institutional providers of arbitration offer
appellate services and have created draft clauses and procedures, and the rules of most
would appear to accommodate appeals, even those without specific appellate rules.90
Finally, should parties prefer to forgo arbitration altogether to eliminate the
risk that they will be unable to secure meaningful review of an irrational award, there
are many other dispute resolution processes from which to choose, including
negotiation, conciliation, mediation, non-binding arbitration, neutral evaluation,
summary jury trial, mini-trial, private judging, and hybrid or self-designed processes
85

See id. at 43. This necessarily is an oversimplification of the application of the public policy doctrine
by the courts. For a thorough review of the three different forms of the public policy exception –
illegality, award, and pure policy – in the context of judicial review of arbitral awards, see Jonathan A.
Marcantel, The Crumbled Difference Between Legal and Illegal Arbitration Awards: Hall Street Associates and the
Waning Public Policy Exception, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 597, 615-16 (2009).
86

See, e.g., Marcantel, supra note 85, at 623-25.

87

See, e.g., Reuben, supra note 19, at 1141-43.

88

See id.

89

Cf. Marcantel, supra note 85, at 623-25.

90 See, e.g., CPR Int’l Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution: Arbitration Appeal Procedure,
available at http://www.cpradr.org (search “Arbitration Appeal”; then follow link); JAMS Optional
Arbitration Appeal Procedure, available at http://www.jamsadr.com/rules-optional-appeal-procedure/
(last visited Oct. 29, 2009). The American Arbitration Association and the National Arbitration
Forum have not established specific rules or procedures for appeals, but appeals appear possible
within their systems. For a short article on this topic, see Paul Bennett Marrow, A Practical Approach to
Affording Review of Commercial Arbitration Awards: Using an Appellate Arbitrator, 60 DISP. RESOL. J. 10
(Oct. 2005).
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limited only by the parties’ imaginations.91 Courts often sponsor alternative dispute
resolution programs for litigants, and federal and many state statutes or court rules
authorize courts to mandate participation in these programs.92 Indeed, the court in
Pugh’s Lawn took note of just some of the options available to parties in Tennessee.93
CONCLUSION
Resolving an unsettled state law issue in the Supreme Court’s Hall Street
decision, the Tennessee Court of Appeals made it clear in Pugh’s Lawn that
Tennessee courts may vacate or modify arbitral awards only under the grounds
provided in Tennessee’s arbitration statute.94 While some have opined that Hall
Street and state law cases like Pugh’s Lawn may be the harbingers of arbitral doom,
there likely still will be those who prefer the relative speed, flexibility, and
confidentiality that the process offers.
Accordingly, parties already embroiled in litigation may still seek to refer
discrete issues to arbitration, yet also to preserve the ability to seek judicial review of
the arbitral result. Hall Street and Pugh’s Lawn appear to contemplate this scenario.95
Consumers of arbitration endeavoring to contract for expanded judicial or other
review of arbitration awards in a pre-dispute context must carefully consider where
to seat the arbitration and must explicitly opt out of the FAA or of the law of a state
such as Tennessee where courts have confined judicial review to statutory grounds.
The contract must make it absolutely clear that the arbitration shall be conducted
pursuant to the applicable state law.
This exercise in forum shopping96 carries some risk as not all state courts
have weighed in on the issue. However, there are states such as California, through
91

A lengthy description of each of these processes is beyond the scope of this short article. For a
more detailed overview of these processes, see Frank E.A. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer, Matching Case
and Dispute Resolution Procedures: Detailed Analysis Leading to a Mediation-Centered Approach, 11 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 1 (2006).
92 See Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (2009); see also TENN. SUP. CT.
R. 31.
93

Pugh’s Lawn Landscape Co. v. Jaycon Dev. Corp., No. W2008-01366-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL
1099270, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2009) (“In Tennessee, parties have several options for
alternative dispute resolution: negotiation, mediation, non-binding arbitration, or arbitration.”).

94

Id., at *6 (TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-5-313 and -314).

95

See supra note 61 and accompanying text.

96 Consideration of the implications of Hall Street in international judicial fora exceeds the scope of this
article, but even more uncertainty is likely in that context as foreign law and the judges applying it may
adopt more or less expansive views of judicial review of arbitral awards.
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case law,97 or New Jersey, by statute,98 that permit parties to contract for expanded
judicial review. Indeed, more legislatures may feel compelled to respond to Hall
Street and state cases like Pugh’s Lawn by amending the relevant arbitration statutes to
clarify any ambiguity regarding the grounds for judicial review of arbitral awards or
explicitly to expand these grounds to include contractually broadened review.99
Parties too risk averse to choose or to rely upon an unfamiliar state and its
laws or to hazard that a state’s court may interpret its laws unfavorably to limit
vacatur may prefer to contract for an arbitral appeal or to decline arbitration
altogether to pursue alternative dispute resolution processes. Fortunately, Tennessee
offers a plethora of dispute resolution options and a “friendly” environment for
parties seeking such alternatives.

97

See Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 190 P.3d 586, 606 (Cal. 2008) (holding that express
arbitral agreements incorporating traditional judicial review are enforceable under the state arbitration
statute).

98
99

See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:23B-4(c) (2009).

Whether state law amendments to this effect may be preempted by the FAA is beyond the scope of
this essay. See, e.g., Reuben, supra note 19, at 1156; Ellis, supra note 17, at 1194.

